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Abstract 
This paper clarifies and expands the ‘perceptions’ view of entrepreneurial risk taking and provides two 
additional concepts to explain why entrepreneurs undertake risky new ventures. The utility-maximizing 
model of entrepreneurship is extended to include these additional concepts. We argue that entrepreneurs will 
truncate risk-reducing information-search, firstly because the delay involved in search activity may cause the 
loss of additional income associated with first-mover advantages, and secondly because the entrepreneur’s 
psychic involvement in the process of becoming an entrepreneur and/or pioneer might be so important that 
he/she trades off risk reduction to become an entrepreneur sooner.  
  
Introduction 
It is commonly presumed that entrepreneurs must have relatively high tolerance for risk, as compared to 
managers of other firms, since it is entrepreneurs rather than corporates who typically start new high-risk 
business ventures (Stinchcombe, 1965; Reynolds, 1986; Phillips & Kirchoff, 1988). But empirical studies of 
entrepreneurial risk propensities have shown mixed results, with some being quite averse to risk, others are 
less averse to risk, and no significant difference found between entrepreneurs and managers of other firms 
(Brockhaus, 1980; Brockhaus & Horwitz, 1986; Low & MacMillan, 1988; Palich & Bagby, 1995; Busenitz, 
1999). Gifford (2003) demonstrates that what might seem to be risk aversion or preference might instead be 
the result of different personal investments in knowledge acquisition. In any case, the lack of a simple 
empirical relationship between attitudes to risk and the risk taking behaviour of entrepreneurs is not 
surprising, the entrepreneur’s attitude to risk is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for the decision to 
behave entrepreneurially (Douglas & Shepherd, 2000). 
A more recent view focuses on the risk perceptions of entrepreneurs. Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg 
(1988) found that entrepreneurs exhibit higher self-efficacy than other managers, and consequently think that 
they are better equipped to deal with risks than are non-entrepreneurs. Palich & Bagby (1995) found that 
entrepreneurs exhibit the cognitive bias of ‘overconfidence’. Busenitz & Barney (1997) and Simon, Houghton 
& Aquino (2000) found that while all managers exhibit overconfidence, entrepreneurs exhibit greater 
overconfidence than do employed managers. Accordingly, entrepreneurs might undertake risky ventures not 
because they are unworried about the risk but because they do not perceive the amount of risk that others do 
in that new venture.  
The ‘perceptions’ view of entrepreneurial risk-taking may not tell the full story, however. Risk taking 
can be defined as undertaking an action without complete information, and the source of new venture risk can 
be largely traced to the incomplete information (or ignorance) in the minds of consumers, producers, and 
managers (Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley, 2000). Lack of knowledge will mean that at least some risks will be 
unperceived, of course. Accordingly, these risks do not even exist for the entrepreneur, and consequently they 
undertake new ventures that others, with better knowledge, would not. If entrepreneurs ‘do not know what 
they do not know’ then they will, particularly if afflicted by overconfidence, leap in and take risks. We need 
to know why entrepreneurs appear to be satisfied with their current quantum of knowledge and why they 
typically eschew, or at least truncate, information search activity.  
In this paper we provide further answers to the question ‘why does the entrepreneur forsake further 
information search activity?’ While Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) and others have asked the same 
question, the question has been answered in terms of cognitive biases. We examine the issue in terms of the 
economics of entrepreneurship and show that there are a series of issues that may reduce the utility expected 
from the entrepreneurial process if additional information search activity were to be undertaken. We bring 
together psychological and economics thinking to argue that entrepreneurs may perceive lesser risk for both 
perceptual and preference reasons.   
In the next section we overview the literature on the perceptions view, the ignorance view, and the 
utility-maximizing view of entrepreneurial risk taking behavior. In the third section we examine two 
additional reasons for truncating information search activity – these relate to the ‘urgency’ and the 
‘involvement’ with which the entrepreneur considers the entrepreneurial process.  The third section discusses 
the implications of the foregoing and suggests a series of propositions that might be tested empirically. 
Finally we conclude with a statement of the contributions made by this study. 
  
Literature review 
  
The Perceptions View of Risk Taking 
  
Krueger & Dickson (1994) looked at the relationship between self-efficacy and its relationship with 
increased risk taking. When self efficacy is inflated to exceed one’s capability to deliver, it becomes 
overconfidence. Palich & Bagby (1995) argued that the operative issue is perceived risk, rather than attitude 
to risk, and that entrepreneurs tend to downplay the risk they perceive, expecting to triumph over any adverse 
situations that arise. They found that entrepreneurs typically possess overconfidence exemplified by their 
consistently looking at new venture opportunities more positively than others (see also Chen, Greene & Crick, 
1998; Forbes, 2005). Cooper, Folta & Woo (1995) argued that higher levels of self-confidence were related to 
lower levels of information search activity, and therefore greater risk bearing due to the entrepreneur’s 
ignorance of the risks being borne. They argued that “the entrepreneur is ‘blinded’ to the need for more 
information due to his/her overconfidence.” (1995:110). Saraswarthy, Simon & Lave (1998) and Hillier 
(1998) found that entrepreneurs are biased in their perceptions of risk and opportunities. Palich & Bagby 
(1995:443) used the term ‘rose-coloured glasses’ to characterize the rosy-hued view taken by entrepreneurs 
who underestimate risk due to overconfidence. 
Busenitz & Barney (1997) and Busenitz (1999) found that entrepreneurs use cognitive biases and 
decision heuristics more than do self-employed managers and accordingly take greater risks without 
necessarily knowing that they are doing so. Faced with high levels of uncertainty and pressure to make 
decisions before the perceived window of opportunity closes, entrepreneurs adopt simplified decision rules 
that allow quick decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). But simple decision rules might be suboptimal and 
thus adversely affect the new venture’s survival prospects. In contrast to the ‘rose-colored’ glasses, we might 
say that the entrepreneur dons ‘dark glasses’ to block out the overload of light (i.e. information) that is 
potentially available but the processing of which would hinder speedy decision making.  
Many studies have attempted to relate individual ‘human capital’ (Becker, 1964) to nascent 
entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial intentions, entrepreneurial behaviour and entrepreneurial performance (see 
Shane, 2003, pp. 61-95 for an overview). Gifford (1998) posits a model of ‘limited attention’ that explains 
why those with greater entrepreneurial ability are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Shane & 
Venkataraman (2000) argue that entrepreneurs who possess proprietary knowledge about new venture 
opportunities appear (to those who lack the information) to be willing to accept greater risk. Baron (2000) 
argues that entrepreneurs’ lower perceptions of risk relates to their lesser ability to engage in counterfactual 
thinking. The human capital literature on entrepreneurship (e.g. Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Kim, Aldrich 
and Keister, 2003) argues that individuals have differing capabilities due to their differing ‘general’ human 
capital (such as age, gender, years of education and work experience) and ‘specific’ human capital (such as 
relevant education and industry experience, relatives who are self-employed, social networks, and so on). 
Most recently, Janney & Dess (2006) argue that the entrepreneur may possess specialized knowledge and 
idiosyncratic resources that mean that risks perceived by others do not apply to the entrepreneur, who 
effectively has superior human capital resources.  
Thus, a person with substantial prior education, knowledge and experience in the relevant technology 
and market realms may see little risk in a particular new venture, while another person without such 
knowledge and experience may view the same new venture as being much more risky. In this view, the 
entrepreneur ‘sees’ things that others do not, somewhat analogous to a person wearing prescription lenses 
tailored exactly to match one’s own visual acuity. Accordingly, we might call this the ‘clear lens effect’ and 
note that one person cannot judge how risky another person’s action is unless they have identically ‘clear’ 
lenses (not to mention the lack of cognitive biases). 
  
The Ignorance View of Risk Taking 
  
Fiet (1996) notes that entrepreneurs can undertake information search activity to reduce the uncertainty 
and risks of a new venture. Shepherd, Douglas and Shanley (2000) argue that the mortality risk of a new 
venture depends on the novelty of its product, its production technology, and the managerial requirements. 
They explain the ‘liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe 1965) in terms of the extent to which the new venture is 
novel in the eyes of customers, producers, and managers. Put another way, new venture mortality risk 
depends on the ignorance (of relevant information) in the minds of customers, producers and managers. Here 
we are concerned with the human capital of the entrepreneur and other managers, and whether they lack the 
general and specific knowledge required to effectively manage the new venture through survival to success. 
Accordingly, the mortality risk existing in any new venture will depend on which particular entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial team is managing the new venture opportunity (see also Gifford, 2003). 
The ignorance view is concerned with the extant knowledge (or its complement, ignorance) held by the 
entrepreneur, and does not examine the relationship between the extent of ignorance (i.e. risk) and one’s 
attitude toward this risk. Implicitly, the ignorance view incorporates risk perceptions by the implication that 
the risks associated with the entrepreneur’s ignorance are not perceived, but it also ignores cognitive biases 
and thus effectively assumes that the entrepreneur is not subject to any cognitive biases.  
  
The Preferences View of Risk Taking 
  
What we are calling the ‘preferences’ view is based upon the utility-maximizing model of career choice 
– i.e. individuals form the intention to start a new business if so doing is expected to deliver greater psychic 
satisfaction than would the best-available employment option (Eisenhauer, 1995). According to Douglas & 
Shepherd (2000) this decision is based on the entrepreneur’s preference (or aversion) for five components of 
entrepreneurship, viz: the utility derived from income, independence, and net perquisites offered by a new 
venture opportunity, and the disutility derived from risk bearing and work effort associated with that new 
venture. They posit that in choosing among different career (including new venture) opportunities, the 
individual’s preferences for income, independence, risk, work and net perquisites are parameters in that 
person’s utility function. The values of the five variables in the utility function depend on the magnitudes 
expected in the context of each career alternative. The total utility for each new venture option is then the sum 
of the products of the attitude parameters and the relevant variable in each alternative. The entrepreneur is 
expected to commit to the alternative that promises the highest level of utility in prospect. 
Thus both risk attitude and risk perception enter the entrepreneur’s utility function. But note that neither 
of them is a necessary or sufficient condition for entrepreneurial behavior – it is the sum of the arguments in 
the utility function that determines the choice between career options, rather than the value of any one 
parameter or variable (Douglas & Shepherd, 2000). Thus, an individual might choose a highly-risky new 
venture (in which great risk might be perceived) despite being highly averse to risk, if expecting to be 
rewarded by high income levels and/or highly-satisfying decision-making autonomy. Thus, it is not surprising 
that studies of intending or practising entrepreneurs might exhibit a variety of risk propensities (Brockhaus, 
1980; Douglas and Shepherd, 2002.)  
  
Entrepreneurial avoidance of risk-reducing information-search activity 
  
Why would entrepreneurs refuse to seek additional information that would serve to reduce risk? In the 
foregoing we have identified overconfidence (the ‘rose-lens’ effect), limiting information search on these 
issues in order to focus on what they perceive to be more important at the time, given the need for speed due 
to limited windows of opportunity (the ‘dark-lens’ effect), and superior human capital resources (the ‘clear-
lens’ effect). We now suggest two more reasons that might reinforce the above. 
  
The Urgency for Entrepreneurial Activity 
  
It may be utility-maximizing to ignore the availability of information if securing that information would 
have an adverse impact on the entrepreneur’s expected income. Search activity costs money and takes time, 
and these aspects of search activity may have a negative impact on the income (and hence the utility) of the 
entrepreneur. This will be particularly so if the entrepreneur has a strong preference for income (or the 
material goods and services that can be purchased using income). 
First, let us consider the impact of search costs. Expenditure on search costs will reduce net income of 
the new venture if they do not result in the capture of additional useful information. Thus information that 
confirms the entrepreneur’s belief that consumers will buy the new product or service is seen as an wasted 
expenditure that simply reduces net income. If the entrepreneur has a positive attitude to income (as expected) 
this reduces the total utility of the new venture. Further, we note that the great majority of new ventures are 
‘bootstrap’ funded (Winborg & Landstrom, 2000), and thus the opportunity cost of the funds required for 
search activity is extremely high, competing with prototype development, the cost of equipment, marketing 
expenses, and so forth. When the opportunity cost is added to the direct cost of search activity, it may be 
perceived as income maximizing and consequently utility maximizing to truncate information search activity 
and channel the funds into what is perceived as a better utilization of those funds. 
Second, search activity takes a significant period of time to set up, to undertake, and to review the data 
derived. This passage of time may be viewed as an obstacle to winning the race to be ‘first-to-market’ and 
subsequently earning superior profits. The first-mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) of the 
pioneer firm are commonly assumed by entrepreneurs to provide competitive advantage, although most 
pioneers do not survive or even maintain market leadership (Tellis & Golder, 1995). But we are concerned 
with a priori perceptions here – if the entrepreneur expects that pioneering will endow the firm with 
significant competitive advantages, any delay due to information search activity might be expected to 
negatively affect the net present value of the firm’s income stream, and thus negatively affect the 
entrepreneur’s total utility. 
Note also that information can be obtained either by search activity prior to launch of the new venture 
or gleaned from experience after the launch of the new venture. The learning-by-doing option may be 
preferred for a number of reasons. First, it does not delay the start-up in a situation where time is of the 
essence because of first-mover advantages. Second, it has no incremental costs and thus does not contribute to 
the ‘burn rate’ prior to launch in the situation where cash balances are critical. Third, it is likely to provide 
better information and thus be a better use of the limited funds. At the margin, the utility-maximizing 
entrepreneur will equate the marginal utility of income with the marginal disutility of risk, such that a dollar 
will only be spent on risk-reduction activity if it is expected to increase the entrepreneur’s total utility. 
To continue the ‘lenses’ analogy introduced earlier, we might call this the ‘yellow-lens effect’ since the 
decision to not undertake information search activity for cost or time reasons is akin to the skier’s decision to 
not spend money and time buying ski goggles, but instead hurrying to get out onto the ski run. Ski goggles 
utilise yellow lenses to achieve greater clarity of vision in high-glare, low-contrast situations, and thereby 
allow the skier to see the moguls, thereby removing some risk from the act of skiing. For the entrepreneur 
yellow lenses represent the information that might be gained from market research, prototype testing, 
management education, and other activities designed to accumulate more knowledge about the technology, 
market and management issues involved in the new venture. The decision to not wear these lenses is no doubt 
related to self-efficacy and overconfidence, as noted by earlier authors, but it also appears to be related to the 
strength of preference for income in the entrepreneur’s utility function.  
  
The Involvement of the Entrepreneur in the Entrepreneurial Process 
  
We now consider issues that impact the utility function via preferences for non-monetary items 
associated with entrepreneurship. The impact of these factors must enter the utility function in the ‘net perks’ 
element proposed by Douglas & Shepherd (2000). This term encompasses all the psychic costs and benefits 
associated with the new venture other than those specifically noted (i.e. income, independence, risk and work 
effort). Here we propose ‘unpacking’ two significant elements from within net perks and arguing that they 
influence the entrepreneur’s decision to truncate search activity.  
First, expenditure on search costs may raise the mortality risk (Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley, 2000) of 
the nascent firm – spending scarce cash on search activity prior to launch reduces the cash balances of the 
new venture and thereby increases the firm’s risk of insolvency (Janney & Dess, 2006). The prospect of new 
venture mortality may be expected to have negative connotations in the mind of the entrepreneur. The 
individual may have a fear of failure, and/or want to avoid the ‘loss of face’, the condemnation of 
disappointed stakeholders, and the jeers of the naysayer that may be associated with new venture failure. 
Thus, considering that the prospect of financial failure probably causes disutility, the entrepreneur will 
undertake search activity only to the point where the marginal conditions for utility maximization are met – 
i.e. the last dollar spent on search activity generates the same absolute quantum of marginal utility from 
expected incremental income as it does marginal disutility from expected failure. 
Second, we argue that there should be an argument in the utility function that reflects the passion or 
emotional involvement that the entrepreneur has for any particular new venture concept. Cooper, Folta & 
Woo (1995:107) argue that entrepreneurs might search less because their ‘entrepreneurial euphoria’ may limit 
their ability to assess their own needs for additional information. This euphoria might be related to one’s need 
for achievement (McClelland, 1961) and be associated with all types of entrepreneurship, but there is likely to 
be a specific source of psychic satisfaction to be gained by being the pioneer in a new market. We will call 
this the ‘preference for pioneering’ and argue that it that might be the major component of ‘entrepreneurial 
euphoria’ in many cases, particularly where the new product or service is a disruptive innovation (Bower & 
Christensen, 1995). 
Being the pioneer involves a significant amount of public recognition from the market, the business 
press, and society more generally. An entrepreneur with high need for achievement or recognition might have 
a relatively strong preference for pioneering, and thus it will have a relatively heavy weight in his/her utility 
function. Accordingly, any delays to the launch of the new venture raise the risk that another firm will be the 
pioneer and the recognition sought by our aspiring pioneer will be lost. This ‘preference for pioneering’ might 
be so strong as to cause extreme haste to get into the market, whatever the risk aversion and the risk 
perceptions of the entrepreneur. 
To continue the lenses analogy, this is analogous to the orange-coloured lenses (a.k.a. ‘blue-blockers) 
that filter out the ‘blue end’ of the visible light spectrum and thus allow better visibility in poor light 
conditions (e.g. when driving or playing baseball at night). In effect, they block out that part of the light 
spectrum (i.e. information) that the individual feels is unnecessary to allow focus on that part of the business 
that the individual thinks is more important. Accordingly entrepreneurs may undertake risky new venture 
because it suits their broader preferences to do so. That is, the utility expected to be derived from pioneering, 
and/or the disutility expected to be avoided by surviving, outweighs the disutility that is associated with 
bearing new venture risk.   
Discussion and Propositions 
  
We propose that entrepreneurs ‘act as if’ they know that risk-reducing information might be available to 
them, but they also know that information search activity costs money and takes time to accomplish, so they 
incorporate into their decision making the impact of additional cost and additional delays on the new 
venture’s prospects for survival and profitability. Even under bounded rationality we should expect the 
entrepreneur to make judgements about the value of further information search according to the impact he/she 
thinks the additional costs and delays will have on the financial success of the new venture. In this paper we 
postulate an urgency effect, or ‘yellow-lens’ effect; viz: that entrepreneurs will truncate information search 
activity at the point where the marginal income from additional search just equals the marginal cost 
associated with additional search (including the loss of future income associated with the first-mover 
advantages). 
The ‘yellow-lens’ effect might be more or less important according to a number of issues. First there is 
the relative cost of information – if information is relatively inexpensive we should expect the marginal 
conditions for utility maximization to be satisfied at higher levels of information search. This is a trivial result 
in itself, since it follows from the marginal conditions of the utility-maximizing model. For an interesting 
result we need to couch the question in terms of the perceived costs of obtaining a specific quantum of 
information (e.g. market research to ascertain consumer reactions to the new product or service) relative to 
the perceived value of the new venture. From standard economic analysis, we expect more income the 
entrepreneur has, or expects to have, the lower will be their marginal utility of income, and thus the lower will 
be the marginal disutility of risk, implying that information search activity has been carried to a higher level. 
This suggests the following testable propositions: 
  
Proposition 1: Entrepreneurs with greater income, wealth, cash balances, and/or expecting greater 
income from their new ventures, will spend more on search activity prior to launch than will other 
entrepreneurs/new ventures, other things being equal. 
  
Proposition 2: The higher the perceived cost of a specific information search (e.g. to ascertain customer 
reaction to the new product or service) relative to the expected value of the new venture, the less information-
search activity will the entrepreneur undertake, other things being equal. 
  
What kinds of situations militate in favour of higher information cost in the context of new ventures? 
Following Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley (2000) we know that new venture risk is based on the ignorance of 
consumers, producers and managers, and that reducing this ignorance reduces risk. Consumer ignorance is 
reduced by advertising, promotion, product demonstrations, comparative testing, and celebrity 
endorsements.  Producer ignorance is reduced by technical training, learning by doing, prototype testing, trial 
production, and durability and safety testing of the finished product. Management ignorance is reduced by 
management education, learning by doing, and consultations with advisory boards and mentors. Considering 
consumer ignorance, we note that although this ignorance resides in the minds of potential consumers, the 
entrepreneur must act to reduce this ignorance in order to reduce the risk of new venture mortality, and that 
this will necessarily include marketing expenditures to build awareness and trust among potential customers.  
The amount of marketing that the new firm will need to undertake to inform potential customers about 
the new product or service will depend on whether the innovation is a search good or an experience good 
(Nelson, 1978; Darby & Karni, 1973). Search goods are those where the quality of the product or service can 
be ascertained at relatively little cost to the consumer (e.g. clothing), whereas experience goods typically 
require the consumer to purchase the item in order to verify the quality claims of the seller (e.g. movies, 
education). For search goods, the seller need simply display the goods, or post information on a website, and 
the buyer’s quality risk is soon overcome, whereas for experience goods the seller needs to spend more time 
and effort persuading the potential consumer to trial the product. This implies that the new venture selling 
experience goods will get less marketing ‘bang for the buck’ (as compared with search goods), and thus 
suggests the following proposition: 
  
Proposition 3: New ventures exploiting search goods will conduct relatively more marketing expense 
than will new ventures selling experience goods, other things being equal. 
  
We might expect ignorance in all three realms to be higher for firms exploiting a radical or disruptive 
innovation, as compared to firms exploiting a creative imitation (Drucker, 1985) or sustaining technological 
improvement (Bower & Christenson, 1995). For sustaining technological improvements there is already a 
considerable amount of extant information in the relevant market and industry about what the product 
category is, what it does, where one buys it, how it works, how it should be managed, and so on. For 
disruptive innovations, on the other hand, all three groups (consumers, producers and managers) are likely to 
be more ignorant about the (new) product category, its benefits, how it works, how to manage it, and so forth. 
In addition, information on technical procedures and management best practice might be less readily available 
and hence more expensive for new ventures exploiting a disruptive innovation, because there would be less 
information available in the public domain, and a lower probability of leakage of that information. This 
suggests the following testable proposition: 
  
Proposition 4: New ventures introducing disruptive innovations will conduct relatively less search 
activity (including marketing expense) than will new ventures selling creative imitations or sustaining 
technological improvements, other things being equal. 
  
Next, we concern ourselves with the time delays associated with information search activity. The time 
spent on information search increases the probability that another firm will be the first-mover and thereby 
relegate the entrepreneur to the status of follower rather than pioneer. Entrepreneurs typically strive to be first 
to market because winning the race to market is thought to be risk-minimizing, cash conserving, and is 
expected to allow monopoly profits at least until followers arrive on the scene. Under what circumstances 
might a new venture be more relaxed about the race to get into the market? One that suggests itself is where 
rival firms will be unable to imitate the product or otherwise usurp the pioneer’s proprietary technology. First-
mover advantages are expected to be more important for disruptive technologies where alternative 
technologies might enter and vie for the industry standard, rather than for sustaining technological 
developments. Where patents are the key to a relatively long period of monopoly exploitation of a new 
technology (as in pharmaceuticals), the urgency is more focussed on gaining patent protection rather than on 
being first to market. If the firm already has patents in place it will be less anxious to establish a foothold in 
the new market, since it will be confident that others cannot legally copy its proprietary technology. We note 
that service innovations are typically not patentable, and it is therefore easier for followers to imitate the 
innovation more quickly. Firms planning to launch new services might also exhibit more urgency to get to 
market first in order to get down their learning curves, and to build (hard-to-copy resources including) service 
efficiency and reputation. Thus new ventures with service innovations might be more anxious to enter the 
market than firms with product innovations. This suggests the following propositions: 
  
Proposition 5: New ventures exploiting technology that is already patented will conduct relatively more 
information search activity than will new ventures goods or services for which patent protection is not yet or 
cannot be attained, other things being equal. 
  
Proposition 6: New ventures with service innovations will conduct less information-search activity than 
will firms with product or process innovations, other things being equal.  
  
Proposition 7: The more important that the entrepreneur perceives the first mover advantages to be, the 
less information search activity he/she will undertake, other things being equal. 
  
If a firm already has a strong brand name, due to prior market activity with other products or services, it 
will be less anxious to get into the market and start building its reputation and brands. Similarly, if the firm 
already has production experience in related manufactures or service provision, it will be less concerned with 
getting into business to start moving down the learning curve before others launch their products. This 
suggests: 
  
Proposition 8: New ventures introducing their initial new product or service will conduct less 
information search activity than will firms introducing their second or subsequent product or service 
innovation, other things being equal.  
  
Moving now to the non-monetary issues (perks) associated with being an entrepreneur; we noted that 
entrepreneurs might gain utility from the simple fact of being a first mover or pioneer, due to their need for 
achievement, for example. Conversely they might gain disutility from the perceived social effects associated 
with new venture failure, and thus prefer to speed up the launch process and become an entrepreneur as soon 
as possible rather than delay the process while further information search is undertaken. We might summarize 
this as the degree of the entrepreneur’s ‘psychic involvement’ in the entrepreneurial process, as opposed to 
their being merely a dispassionate observer of the process. This suggests: 
  
Proposition 9: Entrepreneurs with greater psychic involvement (i.e. who place more weight on the 
psychic benefits of being an entrepreneur and/or being the pioneer in a new market or industry) will conduct 
less information search activity than will entrepreneurs who have lesser psychic involvement in process, other 
things being equal. 
  
Proposition 10: Entrepreneurs who are more averse to the negative social consequences of new venture 
failure will conduct less information search activity than will entrepreneurs who are indifferent or case less 
about the approbation of others, other things being equal.  
  
We now return now to the central question – why do entrepreneurs take the risks that they do? From the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) we expect behavior to be preceded by intentions, which in turn is 
preceded by attitudes. In the context of attitudes to entrepreneurial risk taking, previous research, including 
the analysis of this paper, suggests that perceptions and preferences might moderate the relationship between 
risk attitudes and risk taking intentions and behavior, as follows:  
  
Proposition 11:  The influence of risk propensity on entrepreneurial intentions or actions is moderated 
by five main indicators of risk perceptions: 
a: Positively moderated by overconfidence (rose-lens effect); 
b: Positively moderated by the use of decision heuristics (dark-lens effect); 
c: Positively moderated by human capital (clear-lens effect); 
d: Positively moderated by urgency to gain first-mover advantages (yellow-lens effect); and 
e: Positively moderated by emotional involvement in the venture (orange-lens effect). 
  
Note that this differs from the argument of Sitkin and Weingart (1995) who felt that differences in risk 
propensities would influence risk perceptions. Subsequently, Forlani & Mullins (2000) found no significant 
relationship between the risk propensities and the risk perceptions of entrepreneurs. Here we are arguing that 
there are likely to be interaction effects between risk attitudes and risk perceptions as determinants of 
entrepreneurial intentions (or actions). This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Of course there are other 
determinants of entrepreneurial risk taking which are not the focus of this paper (see for example Janney & 
Dess, 2006).  
  
[Figure 1 near here] 
  
There remains the problem of how to operationalize these proposed new determinants of risk 
perception. The urgency with which the entrepreneur seeks to capture first-mover advantages might be 
measured in terms of whether the intellectual property is considered protectable (more urgent if not); whether 
the innovation is a service (more urgent if so); whether the innovation is disruptive (more urgent if so); and 
whether different technologies are likely to compete for the industry standard (more urgent if so), and so on. 
To measure the entrepreneur’s emotional involvement in a particular new venture will require questionnaire 
items that seek to measure the emotional involvement or psychic income from the project per se, holding 
constant the utility/disutility from other sources such as income, independence, other perquisites, risk 
exposure and work effort. Suggested items might include the monetary value of giving up the option to start 
that business, measures of work-life balance, and comparisons with other sources of psychic income. 
  
Conclusion  
  
Entrepreneurial research has long had difficulty reconciling the extraordinary risk of new ventures with 
the consistent lack of evidence that entrepreneurs are extraordinarily tolerant of risk. The recent focus on the 
different perceptions of risk by entrepreneurs has drawn our attention to the fact that entrepreneurs tend to 
exhibit overconfidence, thus underestimating the risks that they do see (rose-lens effect). Others suggest that 
many entrepreneurs do not see the risk that others see, due to their use of decision heuristics (dark-lens 
effect). A third view is that entrepreneurs have their superior knowledge and other human capital resources 
including social networks (clear-lens effect). This paper introduced two new lenses through which 
entrepreneurs may (or may not) perceive risk in their new venture concept. 
First, the ‘yellow-lens’ effect may cause the entrepreneur to truncate information search because search 
activity may jeopardise winning the race to be first to market. The perceived urgency of starting the new 
venture sooner rather than later relates to higher profits expected as first-mover (as compared to entering the 
market later as a follower). The opportunity cost of search activity may therefore be viewed as a reduction in 
current income (risking bankruptcy) and/or a reduction in future income (by losing first mover advantages). 
The utility-maximizing entrepreneur will equate the marginal utility of income with the marginal disutility of 
risk at the margin. It follows that an entrepreneur with a stronger preference for income will prefer to 
undertake less risk-reducing information search activity. Put another way, the more materialistic is the 
entrepreneur, the more they will care about income relative to risk. 
Second, the ‘orange-lens’ effect may cause the entrepreneur to truncate information search activity if 
the entrepreneur exhibits a preference for the entrepreneurial process per se, which we call ‘involvement’. If 
the entrepreneur gains utility from the process of being first to market and being recognized as the pioneer, 
this element in his/her utility function will exert influence on the amount of risk-reducing information search 
activity undertaken. In effect there is a trade-off between seeking more information and pressing ahead to 
start the new venture (and thus gain recognition and status as the pioneer). At the margin, the utility-
maximizing entrepreneur will equate the marginal utility of pioneering with the marginal disutility of risk. It 
follows that an entrepreneur who has a stronger preference for pioneering (or for becoming an entrepreneur 
sooner) will undertake less information search activity than one who is content to enter the market as an early 
or late follower. In effect, we have formally recognized the ‘entrepreneurial euphoria’ noted by Cooper, Folta 
& Woo (1995) by ‘unpacking’ it from the net perks item (Douglas & Shepherd, 2000) in the entrepreneur’s 
utility function. 
The contributions of this paper include the following. First, we hypothesize two additional determinants 
of the risk perceptions of entrepreneurs, by arguing two situations in which the entrepreneur will truncate 
information search and proceed ahead in blissful (or nervous) ignorance of the risks that may or may not have 
been discovered or reduced by further information search. Second, we offer a taxonomy of lens types that 
allows the simple categorization of the determinants of the entrepreneur’s risk perception. This taxonomy 
provides an ‘easy to remember, easy to teach’ system for educators and consultants to convey these concepts 
to entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs. This taxonomy also serves to reinforce the view that individual 
risk behaviour is not comparable across individuals due to innate cognitive differences, human capital 
differences, and contextual differences. Third, we argue that entrepreneurial risk behavior is concerned with 
the entrepreneur’s reaction to perceived risk, which is a complex function of his/her attitude to risk. We 
propose that the relationship between risk attitude and entrepreneurial intentions (or actions) is moderated by 
the five main determinants (lenses) of risk perception. Fourth, we provide a series of testable propositions that 
emanate from the analysis and suggest several items that might be included in constructs for the involvement 
and urgency variables.   
This paper is a conceptual study that argues a particular model of entrepreneurial risk behavior. Clearly 
there is a need for empirical studies to validate the propositions and the constructs suggested. Almost 
certainly there remain additional determinants of risk perception that might be discovered analytically or 
empirically by researchers as they work to better understand entrepreneurial risk behavior. 
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